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ABSTRACT
Most of the prior work on multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) achieves
optimal collaboration by directly learning a policy for each agent to maximize
a common reward. In this paper, we aim to address this from a different angle.
In particular, we consider scenarios where there are self-interested agents (i.e.,
worker agents) which have their own minds (preferences, intentions, skills, etc.)
and can not be dictated to perform tasks they do not want to do. For achieving
optimal coordination among these agents, we train a super agent (i.e., the man-
ager) to manage them by first inferring their minds based on both current and
past observations and then initiating contracts to assign suitable tasks to workers
and promise to reward them with corresponding bonuses so that they will agree
to work together. The objective of the manager is to maximize the overall pro-
ductivity as well as minimize payments made to the workers for ad-hoc worker
teaming. To train the manager, we propose Mind-aware Multi-agent Management
Reinforcement Learning (M3RL), which consists of agent modeling and policy
learning. We have evaluated our approach in two environments, Resource Col-
lection and Crafting, to simulate multi-agent management problems with various
task settings and multiple designs for the worker agents. The experimental re-
sults have validated the effectiveness of our approach in modeling worker agents’
minds online, and in achieving optimal ad-hoc teaming with good generalization
and fast adaptation.1
1 INTRODUCTION
As the main assumption and building block in economics, self-interested agents play a central roles
in our daily life. Selfish agents, with their private beliefs, preferences, intentions, and skills, could
collaborate (ad-hoc teaming) effectively to make great achievement with proper incentives and con-
tracts, an amazing phenomenon that happens every day in every corner of the world.
However, most existing multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods focus on collaboration
when agents selflessly share a common goal, expose its complete states and are willing to be trained
towards the goal. While this is plausible in certain games, few papers address the more practical
situations, in which agents are self-interested and inclined to show off, and only get motivated to
work with proper incentives.
In this paper, we try to model such behaviors. We have multiple workers and a manager, together
to work on a set of tasks. The manager gets an external reward upon the completion of some tasks,
or one specific task. Each worker has a skill set and preference over the tasks. Note that their
skills and preferences may not align with each other (Fig. 1(a)), and are not known to the manager
(Fig. 1(b)). Furthermore, manager may not get any external reward until a specific task is complete,
which depends on other tasks.
By default, the self-interested workers simply choose the most preferred tasks, which is often unpro-
ductive from the perspective of the entire project. Therefore, the manager gives additional incentives
in the form of contracts. Each contract assigns a goal and a bonus for achieving the goal to a worker.
∗Work done while interning at Facebook AI Research.
1Code is available at https://github.com/facebookresearch/M3RL.
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Figure 1: Illustration of our problem setup. Workers have different skills (abilities for completing
tasks) and preferences (which tasks they like) indicated by the bar charts. They are self-interested
and perform the tasks they prefer the most. To achieve optimal collaboration, a manager has to first
infer workers’ minds, and assigns right bonuses to workers for finishing specified tasks in the form
of contracts. Consequently, workers will adjust their intentions and work together accordingly. E.g.,
workers in the figure initially all want to do task B. To finish all tasks, the manager has to pay more
bonus to worker 1 and 2 so that they will perform A and C respectively.
With the external incentives, workers may choose different goals than their preferences. Upon com-
pletion of assigned goals, the manager receives the rewards associated with those goals and makes
the promised payments to the workers. To generate optimal contracts, the manager must infer the
workers’ minds and learn a good policy of goal and reward assignment.
Conventional approaches of mechanism design tackle similar problems by imposing strong assump-
tions (e.g., skill/preference distributions, task dependencies, etc) to find an analytic solution. In con-
trast, we aim to train a manager using reinforcement learning to i) assess minds of workers (skills,
preferences, intentions, etc.) on the fly, ii) to optimally assign contracts to maximize a collaborative
reward, and iii) is adapted to diverse and even evolving workers and environments.
For this, we propose a novel framework – Mind-aware Multi-agent Management Reinforcement
Learning (M3RL), which entails both agent modeling for estimating workers’ minds and policy
learning for contract generation. For agent modeling, we infer workers’ identities by their perfor-
mance history, and track their internal states with a mind tracker trained by imitation learning (IL).
For contract generation, we apply deep reinforcement learning (RL) to learn goal and bonus as-
signment policies. To improve the learning efficiency and adaptation, we also propose high-level
successor representation (SR) learning (Kulkarni et al., 2016) and agent-wise -greedy exploration.
As a proof of concept, we evaluate our approach in two environments: Resource Collection and
Crafting in 2D Minecraft, to simulate multi-agent management problems. The setup and underlying
assumptions are designed to mimic real world problems, where workers are not compelled to reveal
their true preferences and skills, and there may be dependency between tasks resulting in delayed
and sparse reward signals. Workers may also be deceitful (e.g., accepting a contract even when
the assigned goal is unreachable). Our experiments demonstrate that the manager trained by our
approach can i) estimate the mind of each worker from the recent behaviors, ii) motivate the workers
to finish less preferable or intermediate tasks by assigning the right bonuses, iii) is adaptive to
changing teams, e.g., change of members and/or change of workers’ skills and preferences, iv)
and has good generalization in different team sizes and novel environments.
We have conducted substantial ablation studies by removing the key components, including IL,
SR, agent-wise -greedy exploration, and performance history. Our approach shows a consistent
performance in standard settings as well as in more challenging ones where workers’ policies are
stochastic and sub-optimal, or there are multiple levels of bonuses required to motivate workers.
2 RELATED WORK
Multi-agent reinforcement learning. For collaboration problems, common multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning (Littman, 1994; Busoniu et al., 2008) usually trains agents (Oliehoek et al., 2008;
Foerster et al., 2016; Peng et al., 2017; Omidshafiei et al., 2017; Lowe et al., 2017) so that they will
jointly maximize a shared reward. There also have been work on contributing different credits to
agents by factorized value functions (Koller & Parr, 1999; Guestrin et al., 2001; Sunehag et al., 2018;
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Rashid et al., 2018), but the spontaneous collaboration assumption is still required. In contrast, we
instead train a manager to manage multiple self-interested workers for an optimal collaboration.
Principal-agent problems. Our problem setup is closely related to principal-agent problems (Laf-
font & Martimort, 2002) (or moral hazard problems (Hlmstrom, 1979)) in economics. Our manager
and workers can be considered as the principal and agents respectively, where agents and principal
have different objectives, and the principal needs to provide the right incentives to ensure that the
agents make the best choices for what the principal delegates. These problems face similar tech-
nical challenges as our problem setup, e.g., information asymmetry between principals and agents,
how to setup incentive cost, how to infer agents types, how to monitor their behaviors, etc. Tra-
ditional approaches in economics (Myerson, 1982; Hlmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Sannikov, 2008)
build mathematical models to address these issues separately in stateless games, often with the as-
sumption that the utility functions and the behavior patterns of the agents are known, leading to
complicated models with many tunable parameters. In comparison, our paper provides a practical
end-to-end computational framework to address this problem in a data-driven way without any as-
sumption about the agents’ utilities and their decision making processes. Moreover, this framework
is adaptive to changes of agents preferences and capabilities, which very few papers in economics
have addressed. We also evaluate our approach in more complex game settings than the ones in the
current economics literature.
Mechanism design. Similar to our problem setting, mechanism design also tackles problems where
agents have different and private preferences (Myerson, 1981; Conitzer & Sandholm, 2002). Its core
idea is to set up rules so that the agents will truthfully reveal their preferences for their own interests,
and ultimately an optimal collective outcome can be achieved. Our work differs from mechanism de-
sign in several ways. First, in addition to preferences, we also acknowledge the fact that agents may
have different skills. Second, mechanism design does not consider sequential decision problems,
whereas we have to dynamically change the contracts over time.
Optimal reward design. The contract generation in our work can be seen as reward design. Some
prior work has proposed optimal reward design approaches (Zhang et al., 2009; Zhang & Parkes,
2008; Sorg et al., 2010; Ratner et al., 2018), where a teacher designs the best reward so that the
student will learn faster or alter its policy towards the target policy. In contrast, we try to use deep
RL to train optimal reward design policies to manage multi-agents in more complex tasks.
Meta-learning. Our work also resembles meta-learning (Wang et al., 2016; Finn et al., 2017), which
typically aims at learning a meta strategy for multiple tasks (Maclaurin et al., 2015; Duan et al., 2017;
Hariharan & Girshick, 2017; Wichrowska et al., 2017; Yu et al., 2018; Baker et al., 2017) with good
sample efficiency, or for a fast adaptation (Al-Shedivat et al., 2018). The meta-learning in this paper
is for addressing the problem of ad-hoc teaming (Bowling & McCracken, 2005; Stone et al., 2010)
by training from a limited set of worker population.
Theory of Mind. Our agent modeling is inspired by the prior work on computational theory of
mind, where both Bayesian inference (Baker et al., 2009) and end-to-end training (Rabinowitz et al.,
2018) have been applied to understand a single agent’s decision making by inferring their minds. In
this work, we extend this to optimal multi-agent management by understanding agents’ minds.
3 PROBLEM SETUP
In an environment, there is a set of goals G corresponding to several tasks, N self-interested workers
with different minds, and a manager which can observe workers’ behaviors but is agnostic of their
true minds. Different from the common Markov game setting for MARL in prior work (Littman,
1994), we use an independent Markov Decision Process (MDP), i.e., 〈Si,Ai, Ri, Ti〉, ∀i ∈ N , to
model each worker, where Si and Ai are the state space and action space, Ri : Si × Gi → R is the
reward function, and Ti : Si × Ai → Si is the state transition probabilities. For achieving goals, a
worker has its own policy pii : Si × Gi → Ai. We define the key concepts in this work as follows.
Contract. A contract is a combination of goal and bonus assignment initiated by the manager to a
specific worker. For simplicity, we consider discrete bonuses sampled from a finite set B. Thus, for
worker i at time t, it will receive a contract defined as (gti , b
t
i), where g
t
i ∈ G is the goal and bti ∈ B
is the corresponding bonus for achieving the goal. Note that the contract will change over time.
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Worker’s mind. We model a worker’s mind by its preferences, intentions, and skills. We do not
study worker agents’ beliefs in this paper, which we leave as future work.
Preference. A worker’s preference is formally defined as its bounded internal utilities of achieving
different goals, ui = (uig : g ∈ G), where 0 ≤ uig ≤ umax. Combined with received contract, the
worker agent’s reward function can be defined as
rtig = Ri(s
t
i, g) = (uig + 1(g = g
t
i)b
t
i)1(s
t
i = sg), g ∈ G. (1)
where sg is the goal state.
Intention. The intention of a worker is the goal it is pursuing at any time, i.e., Iti ∈ G, which is
not fully revealed to the manager. Based on the reward defined in Eq. (1), there are multiple ways
to choose the goal. For a rational worker who is clear about its skills, it will choose the goal by
maximizing expected return. I.e., Iti = arg maxg E[
∑∞
t=0 γ
t
ir
t
ig], where 0 < γi ≤ 1 is its discount
factor. However, this requires a worker to have a good estimate of its skills and to be honest, which
is not always true. E.g., a worker may want to pursue some valuable goal that it can not reach. So
an alternative way is to maximize the utility instead: Iti = arg maxg uig + 1(g = gti)bti. This will
make a worker’s behavior more deceptive as it may agree to pursue a goal but will rarely produce
a fruitful result. In this work, we focus on the second way to achieve a more realistic simulation.
After determine which goal to pursue, a worker will decide whether to sign the assigned contact.
We denote this by dti ∈ {0, 1}, where dti = 1 means that worker i signs the contract given at time t.
Skill. The skill of a worker is jointly determined by its state transition probabilities Ti and its policy
conditioned on its intention, i.e., pii(·|sti, Iti ).
Manager’s objective. The manager in our setting has its own utility v = (vg : g ∈ G), where
vg ≥ 0 is the utility of achieving goal g. To maximize its gain, the manager needs to assign contracts
to workers optimally. For the sake of realism, we do not assume that the manager knows for sure
if a worker agent is really committed to the assignment. The only way to confirm this is to check
whether the goal achieved by the worker is consistent with its last assigned goal. If so, then the
manager will gain certain reward based on its utility of that goal and pay the promised bonus to the
worker. Thus, we may define the manager’s reward function as:
rt = RM (St+1) =
∑
g∈G
N∑
i=1
1(st+1i = sg)1(g = g
t
i)(vg − bti), (2)
where St+1 = {st+1i : i = 1, · · · , N} is the collective states of all present worker agents at time
t+ 1. The objective of the manager is to find optimal contract generation to maximize its expected
return E[
∑∞
t=0 γ
trt], where 0 < γ ≤ 1 is the discount factor for the manager. Note that the manager
may get the reward of a goal for multiple times if workers reach the goal respectively.
Population of worker agents. The trained manager should be able to manage an arbitrary com-
position of workers rather than only specific teams of workers. For this, we maintain a population
of worker agents during training, and sample several ones from that population in each episode as
the present workers in each episode. The identities of these workers are tracked across episodes. In
testing, we will sample workers from a new population that has not been seen in training.
4 APPROACH
Our approach has three main components as shown in Figure 2: i) performance history module for
identification, ii) mind tracker module for agent modeling, and iii) manager module for learning
goal and bonus assignment policies. We introduce the details of these three components as follows.
4.1 PERFORMANCE HISTORY MODULE AND MIND TRACKER MODULE
To model a worker’s mind, we first need to infer its identity so that the manager can distinguish
it from other agents. Previous work (Rabinowitz et al., 2018) typically identifies agents via their
trajectories in recent episodes. This only works when diverse past trajectories of agents are available
beforehand. However, this is impractical in our problem as the past trajectories of a worker depends
on the manager’s policy, and thus are highly correlated and can hardly cover all aspects of that agent.
4
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Figure 2: Overview of our network architecture.
In this work, we propose performance history for agent identification, which is inspired by the
upper confidence bound (UCB) algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) for multi-bandit arm (MAB) problems.
Formally, the performance history of worker i is a set of matrices Pi = {P ti = (ρtigb) : t =
1, · · · , T}, where 0 ≤ ρtigb ≤ 1 is an empirical estimation of the probability of worker i finishing
goal g within t steps after signing the contract if promised with a bonus of b. We discuss how to
update this estimate in Algorithm 1. These matrices are then flatten into a vector and we encode it
to a history representation, hi, for worker i.
With identification, the manager uses an independent mind tracker module with shared weights
to update its belief of a worker’s current mental state online by encoding both current and past
information: M(Γti, hi), where Γ
t
i = {(sτi , aτi , gτi , bτi ) : τ = 1, · · · , t} is a trajectory of the worker’s
behavior and the contracts it has received upon current time t in the current episode.
4.2 MANAGER MODULE
For contract generation, the manager has to consider all present workers as a context. Thus, we
encode each worker’s information and pool them over to obtain a context representation, i.e., ct+1 =
C({(st+1i ,mti, hi) : i = 1, . . . , N}). With both individual information and the context, we define
goal policy, pig(·|st+1i ,mti, hi, ct+1), and bonus policy, pib(·|st+1i ,mti, hi, ct+1), for each worker.
In addition to learning policies for individual workers, we also want the manager to estimate the
overall productivity of a team. A common choice in previous literature (e.g., Lowe et al. (2017)) is
to directly learn a centralized value function based on the context. However, this is not informative
in our case, as the final return depends on achieving multiple goals and paying different bonuses. It
is necessary to disentangle goal achievements, bonus payments, and the final net gain.
To this end, we adopt the idea of successor representation (SR) (Kulkarni et al., 2016; Zhu et al.,
2017; Barreto et al., 2017; Ma et al., 2018), but use it to estimate the expectation of accumulated goal
achievement and bonus payment in the future instead of expected state visitation. By defining two
vectors φg(ct) and φb(ct) indicating goal achievement and bonus payment at time t respectively,
we may define our high-level SR, Φg and Φb, as Φg(ct) = E[
∑∞
τ=0 γ
τφg(ct+τ )] and Φb(ct) =
E[
∑∞
τ=0 γ
τφb(ct+τ )]. We discuss the details in Appendix A.1.
4.3 LEARNING
For a joint training of these three modules, we use advantage actor-critic (A2C) (Mnih et al., 2016)
to conduct on-policy updates, and learn SR similar to Kulkarni et al. (2016). In addition, we also
use imitation learning (IL) to improve the mind tracker. In particular, we predict a worker’s policy
based on its mental state representation, i.e., pˆi(·|sti, gti , bti,mt−1i ), which is learned by an additional
cross-entropy loss for action prediction. Section A.2 summarizes the details. As our experimental
results in Section 5 and Appendix C show, in difficult settings such as random preferences and
multiple bonus levels, the policies based on the mental state representation trained with IL have a
much better performance than the ones without it.
As the manager is agnostic of workers’ minds, it is important to equip the manager with a good
exploration strategy to fully understand each worker’s skills and preferences. A common exploration
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strategy in RL is -greedy, where an agent has a chance of  to take random actions. However, this
may cause premature ending of contracts where a worker does not have sufficient amount of time to
accomplish anything. Therefore, we adopt an agent-wise -greedy exploration, where a worker has
as a chance of  to be assigned with a random goal at the beginning of an episode and the manager
will never change that goal assignment throughout the whole episode. In this way, it is easier for a
manager to understand why or why not a worker is able to reach an assigned goal. The details can
be seen from the rollout procedure (Algorithm 1) in Appendix B.
5 EXPERIMENTS
5.1 GENERAL TASK SETTINGS
We introduce the general task settings as follows. Note that without additional specification, workers
are implemented as rule-based agents (detailed in Appendix D.2).
Workers
(a) Resource Collection.
1 2 3 4
5
7 8
6
Recipes:
(b) Crafting.
Figure 3: (a) Resource Collection environment, where the colored blocks are the resources and the
arrows are the workers. (b) Crafting environment (left) and the recipe (right), where the numbers
indicate item categories, and the colored block beside an item shows where this item can be crafted.
5.1.1 RESOURCE COLLECTION
In Resource Collection, the goals are defined as collecting certain type of resources. There are 4
types of resources on a map (Figure 3a) and the total quantity is 10. A worker can find any resources
but only has the skills to dig out certain types of resources. Note that it may not be skilled at
collecting its preferred resources. We consider three different settings:
• S1: Each agent can collect up to three types of resources including its preferred type.
• S2: Each agent can only collect one type of resource which may or may not be its preferred one.
• S3: Similar to S2, except that an agent has a different random preference in each episode and thus
its preference can not be inferred from history.
A worker can take five actions: “move forward”, “turn left”, “turn right”, “collect”, and “stop”, and
its skill is reflected by the effect of taking the “collect’ action. For workers, the internal utility of
a resource is 1 if it is preferred; otherwise it is 0. The manager receives a reward of 3 for every
resource collected under the contracts, and can choose to pay a worker with a bonus of 1 or 2.
5.1.2 CRAFTING
Different from previous work (Andreas et al., 2017) where all items can be directly crafted from
raw materials, we consider three-level recipes (Figure 3b): crafting a top-level item requires crafting
certain intermediate item first. There are four work stations (colored blocks) for crafting the four
types of items respectively. For the manager, each top-level item is worth a reward of 10, but
collecting raw materials and crafting intermediate items do not have any reward. Note that certain
materials are needed for crafting both top-level items, so the manager must strategically choose
which one to craft. In each episode, there are raw materials sufficient for crafting one to two top-
level items. All collected materials and crafted items are shared in a common inventory.
We define 8 goals including collecting raw materials and crafting items. Each worker prefers one of
the collecting goals (the internal utility is 1), and is only capable of crafting one type of items. We
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expands the action space in Section 5.1.1 to include “craft”, which will only take effect if it has the
ability of crafting the intended item and there are sufficient materials and/or intermediate items. The
manager can choose a bonus from 0 to 2 for the contracts, where 0 means no employment.
5.2 BASELINES
For comparison, we have evaluated the following baselines:
• Ours w/o SR: Learning a value function directly w/o successor representations.
• Ours w/o IL: Removing action prediction loss.
• Temporal -greedy: Replacing the agent-wise exploration with conventional -greedy exploration.
• Agent identification using recent trajectories: Encoding an agent’s trajectories in the most recent
20 episodes instead of its performance history, which is adopted from Rabinowitz et al. (2018).
• UCB: Applying UCB (Auer et al., 2002) by defining the management problem as N multi-armed
bandit sub-problems, each of which is for a worker agent. In each MAB sub-problem, pulling an
arm is equivalent to assigning a specific goal and payment combination to a worker agent (i.e.,
there are |G| · |B| arms for each worker agent).
• GT types known: Revealing the ground-truth skill and preference of each worker and removing
the performance history module, which serves as an estimation of the upper bound performance.
5.3 LEARNING EFFICIENCY
(a) Resource Collection (S1) (b) Resource Collection (S2)
(c) Resource Collection (S3) (d) Crafting
Figure 4: Learning curves of all approaches in Resource Collection and Crafting. The rewards here
are not rescaled and we show results from 5 runs in all experiments.
During training, we maintain a population of 40 worker agents. In each episode, we sample a few
of them (4 workers in Resource Collection and 8 workers in Crafting). All approaches we have
evaluated follow the same training protocol. The learning curves shown in Figure 4 demonstrate
that ours consistently performs the best in all settings, and its converged rewards are comparable
to the one trained using ground-truth agent types as part of the observations. Moreover, in more
difficult settings, e.g., S3 of Resource Collection and Crafting, the benefits of IL, SR, agent-wise
-greedy exploration, and the history representations based on the performance history are more
significant. In particular, when there are tasks that do not have any reward themselves such as in
Crafting, SR and IL appear to offer the most critical contributions. Without them, the network hardly
7
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gets any training signals. In all cases, the agent identification by encoding recent trajectories learns
extremely slowly in Resource Collection and fails to learn anything at all in Crafting.
(a) Resource Collection (b) Crafting
Figure 5: Comparison of the adaption capabilities of different exploration strategies during training.
The dashed lines indicate the changing points of the worker agents’ skills. The histograms show
how the skill distribution in the same population evolve over time.
(a) Res. Collection (S1) (b) Res. Collection (S2)
(c) Res. Collection (S3) (d) Crafting
Figure 6: Testing performance when old team members are constantly replaced by new ones.
5.4 ADAPTATION AND GENERALIZATION
In real world scenarios, the population of worker agents and their skills may evolve over time, which
requires the manager to continuously and quickly adapt its policy to the unforeseeable changes
through a good exploration. Thus we compare our agent-wise -greedy exploration with the tem-
poral -greedy exploration in two cases: i) training with a population where workers’ skills change
drastically after 100,000 episodes (the manager does not know when and which workers’ skill sets
have been updated), and ii) testing with a team where 75% of the workers will be replaced with new
ones after every 2,000 episodes. Both strategies keep the same constant exploration coefficient, i.e.,
 = 0.1. To have a better sense of the upper bound in the testing case, we also show the performance
of the baseline that knows ground-truth agent information where no exploration is need. The results
of the two cases are demonstrated in Figure 5 and in Figure 6 respectively.
In the first case, there are moments when the significant change in a population’s skill distribution
(i.e., how many workers can reach a specific goal) will need the manager to greatly change its policy.
E.g., the first two changes in Figure 5a result in new types of resources being collected; the changes
in Figure 5b force the team to craft a different type of top-level item. In such cases, our agent-
wise -greedy exploration significantly improves the learning efficiency and increases the converged
rewards. When the change is moderate, the policy learned by ours is fairly stable.
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(a) Res. Collection (S1) (b) Res. Collection (S2)
(c) Res. Collection (S3) (d) Crafting
Figure 7: Average rewards when different numbers of worker agents are present. The policies are
trained with 4 worker agents in Resource Collection and with 8 worker agents in Crafting.
Figure 8: Testing in novel environments. Figure 9: Performance with random actions.
In the second case, the managers trained by the three methods achieve similar converged rewards in
training. While the converged reward of our approach is slightly lower than the upper bound due to
exploration, it allows the manager to quickly adapt itself to a new team where it has never seen the
most team members. The temporal -greedy on the other hand never achieves a comparable reward
even though its performance is comparable to ours when managing a fixed population.
We also want the manager’s policy to have good generalization in novel scenarios unseen in training,
which, in our problems, has two aspects: i) generalization in different numbers of present worker
agents, and ii) generalization in new environments. It can be seen from Figure 7 that as the number
of workers increases, the manager achieves higher reward until it hits a plateau. Our approach
consistently performs better in all settings. It even gains higher rewards than the one with ground-
truth does when there are fewer workers. We also add a few walls to create novel environments
unseen in training. With the additional obstacles, workers’ paths become more complex, which
increases the difficulty of inferring their true minds. As suggested by Figure 8, the performance
indeed decreases the most in S3 of Resource Collection where online intention inference is critical
as the workers do not have fixed preferences.
So far, we have only considered rule-based worker agents with deterministic plans. To see if our
approach can handle stochastic and sub-optimal worker policies, we may randomize certain amount
of actions taken by the workers (Figure 9) and train a manager with these random policies. When
the randomness is moderate (e.g., ≤ 20%), the performance is still comparable to the one without
random actions. As randomness increases, we start to see larger decrease in reward. In Crafting
specifically, random policies make the workers unlikely to achieve assigned goals within the time
limit, thus the manager may never get top-level items if the policies are too random.
More results. In addition to the main experimental results discussed above, we further test our
approach from different perspectives: i) showing the effect of the minimum valid period of a contract
9
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(i.e., constraints for the manager’s commitment), ii) multiple bonus levels, and iii) training RL agents
as workers. We summarize these results in Appendix C.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose Mind-aware Multi-agent Management Reinforcement Learning (M3RL)
for solving the collaboration problems among self-interested workers with different skills and pref-
erences. We train a manager to simultaneously infer workers’ minds and optimally assign contracts
to workers for maximizing the overall productivity, for which we combine imitation learning and
reinforcement learning for a joint training of agent modeling and management policy optimization.
We also improve the model performance by a few techniques including learning high-level succes-
sor representation, agent-wise -greedy exploration, and agent identification based on performance
history. Results from extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach learns effectively, gen-
eralizes well, and has a fast and continuous adaptation.
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A DETAILS OF APPROACH
A.1 HIGH-LEVEL SUCCESSOR REPRESENTATION
We define two vectors indicating the goal achievement and bonus payment at time t: φg(ct) =
(
∑
i 1(s
t+1
i = sg)1(g
t
i = g) : g ∈ G) and φb(ct) = (
∑
i 1(s
t+1
i = sgti )1(b
t
i = b) : b ∈ B). Let
w = (b : b ∈ B) be the weights for different bonus payments, then the reward for the manager at the
current moment can be written as rt = v>φg(ct)−w>φb(ct). Following the typical SR definition,
we define our high-level SR as
Φg(ct) = E
[ ∞∑
τ=0
γτφg(ct+τ )
]
, (3)
and
Φb(ct) = E
[ ∞∑
τ=0
γτφb(ct+τ )
]
. (4)
Thus, the value function can be written as
V (ct) = v>Φg(ct)−w>Φb(ct). (5)
A.2 DETAILS OF LEARNING
The policy gradient for the goal assignment is:
∇θgJ(θg) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∇θg
[
log pig(gti |sti,mt−1i , hi, ct; θg)A(ct) + λH(pig)
]
, (6)
where A(ct) is the advantage estimation defined as A(ct) =
∑∞
τ=0 γ
τrt+τ − (v>Φg(ct) −
w>Φb(ct)) andH(·) is the entropy regularization weighted by the constant λ = 0.01 for encourag-
ing exploration. Similarly, the policy gradient for the bonus assignment is
∇θbJ(θb) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∇θb
[
log pib(bti|sti,mt−1i , hi, ct; θb)A(ct) + λH(pib)
]
. (7)
The successor representations may be updated by the following gradient:
∇θΦg
1
2
( ∞∑
τ=0
γτφg(ct+τ )− Φg(ct; θφg )
)2
+∇θ
Φb
1
2
( ∞∑
τ=0
γτφb(ct+τ )− Φb(ct; θφb)
)2
. (8)
For imitation learning, we use the following cross-entropy loss:
LIL = E
[
− 1
N
N∑
i=1
log pˆi(ati|sti, gti , bti,mt−1i )
]
. (9)
Note that the gradient from IL will be combined with Eq. 6, Eq. 7, and Eq. 8 to update corresponding
parameters (see Algorithm 2 in Appendix B for details).
In tasks where there the unknown dependency may introduce a large cost in the beginning of training,
the manager’s exploration may be restricted as the policy becomes too conservative in spending,
which is common in many real world scenarios. To encourage exploration in these tasks, we adopt a
two-phase learning curriculum. Namely, we optionally conduct a warm-up phase before the standard
learning described above. In this warm-up phase, we give loans to the manager to cover its cost (i.e.,
setting the total payments to be zero when optimizing the networks). In practice, we apply this only
to Crafting, where we set a fixed number of episodes at the beginning of training to be the warm-up
phase. Note that this only apply to the optimization; we still need to deduct the payments from the
rewards as the actually outcomes (this is equivalent to paying back the loans).
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Algorithm 1 Rollout(Tmax, Tc, , {Pi : i = 1, · · · , N})
Input: Maximum steps Tmax, commitment constraint Tc, exploration coefficient , and the performance history
of the present worker agents {Pi : i = 1, · · · , N}
Output: Trajectories of all workers {ΓTi : i = 1, · · · , N}, and the rewards for the manager R
1: Initialize the environment
2: Set performance history update rate η = 0.1.
3: t← 0
4: Γ1i ← ∅, ∀i = 1, · · · , N
5: repeat
6: Observe current states (sti, a
t
i), ∀i = 1, · · · , N , from the environment
7: Encode Pi to hi, ∀i = 1, · · · , N
8: if t = 0 then
9: for i = 1, · · · , N do
10: Γ0i ← ∅
11: Sample a random goal g0i ∼ G, and set a minimum bonus b0i as the initial contract.
12: ei ∼ U(0, 1)
13: Assign the contract (g0i , b
0
i ) to worker i and receive d
t
i (signing decision)
14: τi ← dti
15: Γti ← {(sti, ati, gti , bti)}
16: end for
17: rt ← 0
18: else
19: rt =
∑
g∈G
∑N
i=1 1(s
t
i = sg)1(g = g
t−1
i )(vg − bt−1i )
20: mt−1i ←M(Γt−1i , hi), ∀i = 1, · · · , N
21: ct ← C({(sti,mt−1i , hi) : i = 1, . . . , N})
22: for i = 1, · · · , N do
23: τ ′i = τi
24: if (t− 1)%Tc 6= 0 or ei <  then # Commitment constraint and agent-wise -greedy
25: gti ← gt−1i
26: else
27: Sample a new goal gti ∼ pig(·|sti,mt−1i , hi, ct)
28: τi ← τi1(gti = gt−1i )
29: end if
30: Sample a new bonus bti ∼ pib(·|sti,mt−1i , hi, ct) (w/ temporal -greedy)
31: Assign the contract (gti , b
t
i) to worker i and receive d
t
i
32: τi ← τi + dti
33: Γti ← Γt−1i ∪ {(sti, ati, gti , bti)}
34: if τ ′i > τi or sti = sgt−1i then # the last contract was accepted and has been terminated now
35: ρτ
′
i
igt−1bt−1 ← (1− η)ρ
τ ′i
igt−1bt−1 + η1(s
t
i = sgt−1i
)
36: end if
37: end for
38: end if
39: R← R ∪ {rt}
40: t← t+ 1
41: until t = Tmax or the task is finished
42: T ← t
Algorithm 2 Learning Algorithm
1: Initialize parameters
2: Set the maximum steps of an episode to be Tmax, maximum training episodes to be Ntrain, and the number
of worker agents in an episode to be N
3: The coefficient for the agent-wise -greedy exploration to be 
4: Initialize a population of worker agents and set their performance history P to be all zeros.
5: for i = 1, · · · , Nmax do
6: Sample N worker agents from the training population and obtain their performance history {Pi : i =
1, · · · , N}
7: # Run an episode
8: {ΓTi : i = 1, · · · , N}, R← Rollout(Tmax, Tc, , {Pi : i = 1, · · · , N})
9: Update parameters based on the IL loss LIL defined in Eq. (9) and the gradients defined Eq. (6),
Eq. (7), and Eq. (8) jointly.
10: end for
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(a) Res. Collection (S1) (b) Res. Collection (S2)
(c) Res. Collection (S3) (d) Crafting
Figure 10: Learning curves in three settings of Resource Collection and in Crafting when applying
different commitment constraints for the manager. The numbers indicate how many steps a contract
must holds.
B PSEUDO CODE OF OUR ALGORITHMS
We summarize the rollout algorithm and the learning algorithm in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2
respectively.
C MORE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
C.1 CONSTRAINING THE MANAGER’S COMMITMENT
The manager’s commitment is defined as the shortest time a contract must remain unchanged, which
essentially constrains how frequent the manager can change its goal and bonus assignment. While
short-term commitment allows the manager to quickly update contracts once it has a better mind
estimation or once a goal has been reached, long-term commitment often leads to a more accurate
skill assessment when the tasks are difficult (e.g., crafting high-level items depends on the results of
other tasks and thus needs a longer time). This is supported by the results in Figure 10: shorter com-
mitment works better in Resource Collection while Crafting needs a longer commitment. Note that
the commitment constraint is 1 step and 10 steps for Resource Collection and Crafting respectively
in all other experiments.
C.2 MULTIPLE BONUS LEVELS
In previous experiments, the internal utility of goals for a worker agent is either 0 or 1. Here, we
sample the internal utility from 0 to 3. Consequently, the manager needs to select the right bonus
from multiple choices to pay each worker (i.e., a bonus from 1 to 4 for Resource Collection and a
bonus from 0 to 4 for Crafting). In Resource Collection, the manager will get a reward of 5 for every
collected resource; in crafting, the reward for a top-level item is still 10. As shown in Figure 11, the
advantage of our approach is even more significant compared to the ones in single payment level.
C.3 RL AGENTS AS WORKERS
Finally, we train a population of 40 RL worker agents for Resource Collection, where each one
is trained with only one goal, and for each goal we train 10 agents using different random seeds.
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(a) Res. Collection (3 skills) (b) Res. Collection (1 skill)
(c) Crafting
Figure 11: Learning curves when there are multiple bonus levels. In (a), a worker can reach 3 goals;
in (b), a worker can reach 1 goal; in (c), a worker can collect raw materials and craft one type of
items.
Figure 12: Comparing training with rule-based worker agents and with RL worker agents in Re-
source Collection.
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This creates a population with similar skill distributions as in S2, but with very different policies.
Figure 12 suggests that training to manage RL agents is slower as their policies are less predictable
and less rational, but our approach can still gradually learn a good policy whose performance is
comparable to the one using rule-based worker agents.
D IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
D.1 NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
Performance History Module. We flatten the matrices in worker’s performance history Pi and
concatenate them together to get a single vector. We then encode this vector into a 128-dim history
representation hi.
Mind Tracker Module. We represent the state of a worker by multiple channels corresponding
to different types of items. We also use four channels to indicate its orientation. We augment
the state with additional |A||G||B| channels, where a channel is either all ones or all zeros for
indicating the action it takes, and the goal and bonus it receives. We then encode the state into
a 128-dim hidden state by a convolutional layer with 64 channels and kernels of 1 × 1, a fully
connected (FC) layer (128-dim), and an LSTM with 128 hidden units. We fuse this vector with
the history representation hi. Specifically, we adopt an attention-based mechanism for the fu-
sion, where we first get an attention vector (128-dim) from the history representation by an FC
layer with sigmoid activation, and then do element-wise product between the attention vector and
the hidden state from the LSTM. The fused vector becomes mti. This can be formally written as
mti = f(`
t
i, hi) = `
t
i  σ(hi), where σ(·) is an FC layer with sigmoid activation, `ti is the hidden
state from the LSTM, and  is element-wise product. We fuse it with the state using the same
mechanism: f(φ(st+1i , g
t+1
i , b
t+1
i ),m
t
i) = φ(s
t+1
i , g
t+1
i , b
t+1
i ) σ(mti), where φ(st+1i , gt+1i , bt+1i )
is the state encoding. By feeding the fused vector to an FC layer with softmax activation, we may
get the predicted worker policy.
Manager Module. For each worker, we concatenate its mind representation and history repre-
sentation together and fuse it with the worker’s state using the attention-based mechanism where
the attention vector comes from the concatenated vector. By pooling over these fused vectors of
individual workers, we can get the context vector, from which we construct the two successor rep-
resentations by two separate FC layers. Here, we use average pooling, but one may also use other
pooling mechanisms. Finally, for each worker, we concatenate the context vector with its fused vec-
tor we obtained before pooling, and consequently get the goal policy and bonus policy by two FC
layers with softmax activation.
All modules are trained with RMSProp (Tieleman & Hinto, 2012) using a learning rate of 0.0004.
D.2 RULE-BASED WORKER AGENTS
Each rule-based worker finds a shortest path to the nearest location related to a goal, and its skill
is defined as the post effect of its “collect” and “craft” actions. In particular, for collecting certain
resource/material, it will go to the closest one that has the same type as the goal indicates and is
currently not being collected by other agents, whereas for crafting an item, it will go to the corre-
sponding work station if it is currently unoccupied. If a worker can perform collecting tasks, then
after it takes “collect” action, the item will be collected from the map and appears in the inventory;
otherwise no real effect will appear. This applies to crafting tasks as well, except in crafting, task
dependencies must also be satisfied before “craft” action can take real effect.
When considering random actions, for each step, we sample a random action with the specified
chance to replace the action from the rule-based plan.
D.3 RL WORKER AGENTS
We implement all RL worker agents using the same network architecture, where an agent’s state is
augmented by additional channels to include the reward for each goal (i.e., |G||B| channels). We
use a convolution layer with 64 channels and kernels of 1 × 1 to encode the state, and feed it to an
128-dim FC layer and then an LSTM with a 128-dim hidden state. We then predict the policy using
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an FC layer with softmax activation based on the hidden state from the LSTM. For each goal, we
train 10 RL worker agents using 10 random seeds. For each episode, we randomly assign a reward
from b ∈ B to an agent as the hypothetical reward it may receive from a manager. We then set the
corresponding channel to be all ones and set the remaining |G||B| − 1 channels to be all zeros. Note
that we assume all RL workers have the ability to perform “collect” and “craft” actions.
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